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1. Introduction
In the recent past, regulatory costs have received
a great deal of attention within the Swiss wealth
management industry. On the one hand, financial
institutions are intensifying their focus on cost
management in general, due to the plunge of fees
and commissions since the bubble burst on glob-
al equity markets. On the other hand, wealth
management institutes are faced with rapidly in-
creasing regulatory requirements, leading to a
significant rise in their regulatory costs.
Neither in theory nor in practice is there any doubt
regarding the economic rationale and the necessity
for regulation in the financial industry. Basically,
bank regulation is justified as a means of prevent-
ing potential market failures in the financial
sector,[1] in order to protect depositors and the
financial system as a whole.[2] The characteristics
of the wealth management business, such as
agency problems and asymmetric information,
may lead to risky behaviour on the part of wealth
management institutes and potential losses for
depositors and investors.[3] A crisis in a single
financial institute may easily lead to a crisis of
confidence in the whole sector, with harmful
consequences on monetary transactions and other
industries within an economy.[4]
Additionally, regulators and supervisors are paying
a great deal of attention to protecting the reputation
of the financial industry and financial centres. The
prevention of activities such as money laundering
and the financing of terrorism is of paramount
importance within this context.[5]
Yet, despite the positive effects of these regulatory
interventions, their cost has to be considered, too.
In fact, it is only if the overall benefits of regu-
lation exceed its cost that regulation ultimately
yields a profit. Attempts to quantify the cost of
regulation can be found in the U.S. and the U.K.
In Switzerland, however, there is still a lack of
information on the regulatory burden of financial
institutions.
2. Review of the Literature
Theoretical aspects of regulation in general, as well
as the specific regulation of the financial system,
are widely covered in the literature. Furthermore,
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several articles in both academic and practical
journals discuss the optimum extent of regulation
and the advantages and drawbacks of regulatory
systems. Nevertheless, there have been only a few
attempts in the literature to quantify regulatory
costs, most likely owing to the difficulty of assess-
ing them quantitatively.
Elliehausen’s (1998) review paper provides an
interesting overview of 15 U.S. studies from 1976
to 1994 regarding regulatory costs. It questions the
statistical significance of many of the results, but
still provides a valuable insight into the quantita-
tive world of regulatory costs.
In 1998, Franks, Schaefer and Staunton investigat-
ed the regulatory burden of British brokers and
investment management firms. Among other
results, they quantified the regulatory burden as
GBP 2’135 and GBP 2’690 per capita, respectively.
In 2003, a study by Europe Economics analysed the
cost of the British regulatory system and showed
that the prevention of money laundering accounts
for the greater part of the total regulatory burden.
The Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC)
annually surveys the auditing costs of Swiss
financial institutes. The results show a clear trend
of continuously increasing regulatory costs for
auditing issues and strong economies of scale.
3. Methodology
In the autumn of 2003, the Swiss Banking Institute
of the University of Zu¨rich (ISB) initiated a series
of studies[6] on the regulatory burden of Swiss
wealth management institutes for the year 2002.
The primary aim of these studies was to compare
the impact of regulation on the costs of different
regulatory frameworks applicable to the provision
of wealth management services. The empirical
measurement of these expenses is based on a
framework set up by the British Financial Services
Authority (FSA). The FSA is obliged to assess the
economic costs and benefits of each proposed
policy, by carrying out a Cost Benefit Analysis
(CBA).[7] Thus, it tries to avoid the implementa-
tion of regulations whose additional benefits are
offset by supplementary costs.[8]
In contrast to such a CBA, the studies conducted
by the ISB clearly focus on the assessment of
regulatory costs, while benefits are not quantified.
The participants in the survey were merely asked
to rank the different fields of regulation according
to their importance for the Swiss financial indus-
try, in order to assess their relative benefits.
The cost categories in the ISB studies follow the
CBA framework of the FSA, which distinguishes
between direct, compliance and indirect costs.
Direct costs comprise the resources needed within
the body of the financial regulator to design,
monitor and enforce regulations. In the U.K., costs
for ongoing supervision are incurred by the FSA
and are regarded as direct costs. In Switzerland,
however, a certain degree of supervisory responsi-
bility is delegated to designated auditing compa-
nies. The ISB studies define these costs as a new
cost category called incremental auditing costs,
since the Swiss Bdual supervision system^ forces
external auditors to fulfil ongoing supervisory
functions. According to the SFBC, this bucket
includes external and internal incremental auditing
costs, whereas incremental costs only comprise
costs which would not have been incurred in the
absence of regulation.
Compliance costs are the costs incurred by finan-
cial institutes as a result of activities required by
regulators.[9] Again, the focus lies on the incre-
mental part of the costs, which of course is a
subjective and often difficult quantity to delimit.
Compared to the FSA framework, the ISB studies
do not quantify the least obvious, hard-to-measure
indirect costs. Indirect costs are opportunity costs
and arise from missed income, reduced competition
and loss of business to other, less regulated
countries.[10]
Consequently, the ISB studies distinguish between
the following cost categories: (1) direct costs, (2)
incremental auditing costs and (3) compliance
costs.
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4. Data
The data used were gathered through question-
naires. The drawbacks of this approach, such as
potential misunderstanding of the questions, were
mitigated by intense consultation of experts during
the design and realisation phases. The results are
based on responses from 48 Swiss wealth man-
agement institutes, comprising 17 members of the
Association of Swiss Commercial and Investment
Banks (ASCB), 10 members of the Association of
Swiss Private Bankers (ASPB) and 21 Securities
Dealers (SD). The information about Independent
Asset Managers (IAM) is based on 371 responses
and estimates of their regulatory burden. Table 1
shows the number, the average headcount and the
range of headcounts within the institutes described.
From a statistical point of view, the size of the
sample is rather too small to assign reliability to
the results. In addition, the difficulty of estimating
the cost of regulation, and especially of delimit-
ing the incremental part, was a very likely source
of data bias. The quality of the data was therefore
assessed carefully.
In the first place, several control questions were
incorporated into the questionnaires in order to al-
low quality as well as consistency checks. Second-
ly, a large number of consistency tests were carried
out in order to uncover potential bias and dis-
tortions of the sample data (e.g., through outliers);
the outcomes of these tests confirmed the scale of
the findings.[11] Finally, the results were com-
pared with findings from other studies, such as the
SFBC survey on the auditing costs of Swiss fi-
nancial institutes, which again confirm the scale of
the results.[12] The conclusion of the quality as-
sessment is that the quality of the data is satisfac-
tory, and that the data are able to reveal both the
basic characteristics and the scale of the regulatory
burden of the wealth management firms analysed.
Within the scope of the ISB studies, the ASCB
Banks, Private Bankers and SDs questioned were
invited to assess the costs and benefits of seven
regulatory fields in a qualitative manner. Table 2
illustrates the cost-benefit ranking and the result-
ing ranking differences for the specific regulatory
fields.
The greatest costs arise in those regulatory fields
where the benefits seem to be highest. This is
shown by the rank correlation coefficients. The
largest gap between costs and benefits is exhibited
by the regulatory field of equity/liquidity/account-
ing, and is especially pronounced for SDs.
5. The Four Regulatory Frameworks
in Wealth Management
In Switzerland, wealth management can be con-
ducted through various regulatory frameworks:
Wealth Management Banks, Private Bankers,
Security Dealers (SD) and Independent Asset
Managers (IAM).
Banks are subject to the strictest regulation and
supervision, based on the Federal Banking Act
(FBA), the ordinance to the Federal Banking Act
(FBO), the guidelines of the SFBC, and self-
regulation. The law basically sees a bank as an
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Table 1: Number of Providers and Average Headcount of the Different Regulatory Frameworks
Regulatory Framework Number of Providers Sample Average Headcount Headcount: Range
Bank (ASCB members only) 30 17 280 14Y2274
Private bankers 15 10 240 43Y1661
Securities dealer
(without banking license)
65 21 26 3Y96
Independent asset manager 2’000Y2’500 (371) 4 1Y200
Sources: ASPB, BU¨HRER (2004), HUBLI (2004), MARTI (2004), SAAM, SFBC (2004b), SNB (2004).
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enterprise which operates in the classic business of
interest margins; thus, the regulatory concept for
banks is directed primarily at commercial banking
and the limitation of inherent risks. In Switzerland,
the system of universal banks prevails. This
allows banksVif they so wishVto participate in
all banking businesses. Nevertheless, there are
many banks which focus on particular business op-
portunities. The 30 ASCB Banks are mainly active
in wealth management, are organised as stock
corporations and have a securities dealer’s license.
On average, these banks have 280 employees.
The Private Banker status is regulated by the
FBA. The legal status of such institutes covers
sole ownership, registered partnership, limited
partnership and limited partnership with shares.
The specific status of Private Bankers is charac-
terised by the presence of at least one partner with
unlimited liability for the bank’s commitments.
Based on the unlimited and joint liability of the
participators, they benefit from certain regulatory
privileges and thus wear a somewhat looser
regulatory corset than other banks. Private Bank-
ers who do not advertise publicly enjoy a certain
relief with regard to their capital surplus accumu-
lation and are not obliged to publish their balance
sheet and income statement. Their civil law
responsibility is regulated in the Swiss code of
obligations (CO), and is thus different from that
which applies to stock corporation banks. Private
Bankers are not subject to double taxation as stock
corporations are, but face disadvantages in the
area of income tax and social security contribu-
tions: the total earnings of partnership compa-
niesVeven if reinvestedVare subject to income
tax and to pension and public social security pay-
ments. Social security contributions are deducted
not only from salaries, but also from total earn-
ings.[13] In Switzerland, there exist 15 Private
Bankers employing an average of 240 persons each.
Securities Dealers (SD) are regulated through the
Federal Act on Securities Exchanges and Securities
Trading (SESTA). The associated ordinance and a
circular drawn up by the SFBC define five cate-
gories of SD: own-account dealers, issuing houses,
derivative houses, market makers and client deal-
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Table 2: Cost-Benefit Ranking for Different Regulatory Fields
Regulatory fields
ASCB
Banks
Private
Bankers
Securities
Dealer
ASCB
Banks
Private
Bankers
Securities
Dealer
Cost
rank
Benefit
rank
Cost
rank
Benefit
rank
Cost
rank
Benefit
rank
Ranking
difference
Ranking
difference
Ranking
difference
Prevention of
money laundering
1 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1
Risk management 3 4 4 5 3 2 j1 j1 1
Equity/liquidity/
accounting
2 4 2 2 1 4 j2 0 j3
Market behaviour 4 3 3 2 4 3 1 1 1
Independence of
financial analysis
7 7 7 6 7 5 0 1 2
Guidelines on
portfolio
management
agreements
5 2 5 2 5 6 3 3 j1
Fund distribution 6 6 6 6 6 7 0 0 j1
Spearman rank
correlation
coefficients
0.73 0.79 0.68
Sources: HUBLI (2004), MARTI (2004).
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ers, the last-named being predominately active in
the wealth management business. The regulation of
the SDs is very similar to bank directives and is the
same for all categories. Whereas SDs are allowed
to make loans (e.g., lombard credits) and keep
deposits and custody accounts, only banks are
allowed to offer interest on clients’ accounts. Thus,
SDs are not allowed to operate in the interest
margin business. The auditing rules and licensing
regulations are equally applicable to SDs and
banks; an important difference, however, concerns
the minimum capital prerequisites, since SDs have
to raise at least CHF 1.5 millions, compared to a
CHF 10 millions requirement for banks. Regarding
special regulatory rules[14], which are particularly
relevant in wealth management, there are no major
differences between the regimes of SDs and banks.
In Switzerland, there are 65 SDs without banking
licenses, with an average headcount of 26.
In Switzerland, 2’000 to 2’500 Independent Asset
Managers (IAM) function as financial intermedi-
aries between private clients and banks; they oper-
ate with an average headcount of approximately 4.
IAMs are subject to the CO, but they are not subject
to prudential[15] regulation. Authorisation is non-
obligatory for IAMs to carry out their business.[16]
Neither the banking secrecy rules nor the broadly
similar professional secrecy rules for SDs apply to
IAMs.[17] All IAMs are regulated through the
Federal Act on the Prevention of Money Launder-
ing in the Financial Sector (MLA). They are
supervised either by intermediaries’ recognised
self-regulating bodies or by the federal control
authority to combat money laundering (control
authority). Some professional associations such as
the Swiss Association of Asset Managers (SAAM)
have binding codes of professional ethics for their
members.[18] In contrast to the other regulatory
frameworks, IAMs are not authorised to keep
accounts or deposits. Consequently, their clients’
assets are placed in the custody of a bank. IAMs are
responsible to their clients for loyal and accurate
accomplishment of the assigned mandate. If assets
are invested on the basis of improper conflicts of
interest (e.g., churning, violation of the portfolio
management guidelines, scalping or front running)
liability for damages may result from the CO and
from Swiss Penal Law.[19]
6. Regulatory Costs
The regulatory burden basically depends on three
factors. Firstly, it is influenced by the institute’s
regulatory status. Secondly, the institute’s primary
activity (i.e., securities trading, wealth manage-
ment, fund distribution, etc.) plays a major role.
Thirdly, the size of the firm is important, because
of distinctive economies of scale.
The costs of regulation (CHF per capita year
2002) for ASCB Banks, Private Bankers and SDs
are illustrated in Table 3. The ASCB Banks have
additionally been subdivided into large and small
corporations, with a threshold level of 100
employees being taken as the distinction between
the two subcategories. The SDs, all of whom
employ fewer than 100 persons, have been sub-
divided with regard to their main activity (wealth
management or securities trading).
The regulatory burden for the IAMs has not been
analysed systematically, and only estimates are
available. Generally, it is difficult to estimate the
regulatory burden of IAMs, as they vary widely
with regard to size, legal structure and activity.
The total regulatory burden per capita for IAMs is
around CHF 6’800; this figure is made up of about
CHF 3’000 compliance costs, about CHF 2’700
incremental auditing costs and about CHF 1’100
direct costs. These figures are underpinned by
inputs from representatives of a few self-regulat-
ing bodies, the control authority and several
IAMs. In 2003, the University of St. Gallen
surveyed 500 Swiss IAM companies with regard
to the total regulatory costs that arise from the
prevention of money laundering (other incremen-
tal regulatory costs excluded). The average cost
for the responding companies was CHF 20’000.
Assuming a company has four employees, the cost
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per capita would thus amount to CHF 5’000,
which supports the estimated CHF 6’800 total
regulatory burden for IAMs. Furthermore, it
shows that almost all of the regulatory costs are
generated by the prevention of money laundering.
The total regulatory burden per capita amounts to
approximately CHF 12’200 and CHF 28’700 for
large and small ASCB Banks respectively, to CHF
7’000 for Private Bankers and to CHF 18’600 and
CHF 14’200 for SDs.
Compliance costs make up the lion’s share of the
regulatory burden, representing at least 80% of the
total charges. Compliance costs are highest for
the small ASCB Banks, followed by the SDs and
the large ASCB Banks; of all prudential-regulated
frameworks, it is the Private Bankers who bear the
lowest compliance costs. This ranking is more or
less the same for all compliance subfields, such as
the prevention of money laundering, risk manage-
ment, equity/liquidity/accounting requirements,
and others. The costs arising from the prevention
of money laundering mainly make up the greater
part of the compliance cost (except for SDV
Securities Trading). This result is in line with other
surveys showing that the initiatives of regulators
and supervisors to prevent money laundering and
the financing of terrorism have resulted in enor-
mous increases in the burden of compliance.[20]
The incremental auditing costs are between 6%
and 16% of the total regulatory burden; they are
again highest for the small ASCB Banks, followed
by the SDs, the large ASCB Banks and the Private
Bankers. The proportion of external and internal
auditing costs varies according to the regulatory
framework: whereas, for the SD, the charges for
the external audit are twice as high as for the
internal one, the opposite is true in the case of
ASCB Banks and Private Bankers.
Despite their increasing growth, the direct costs
are of little importance compared to the other
regulatory costs; they are highest for SDs, and
only half as high for small ASCB Banks. Direct
costs for Private Bankers and ASCB Banks are
less than CHF 100 per capita.
7. Recommendations
In wealth management competition, market disci-
pline and self-regulation are preferable to financial
market regulation to guarantee system stability
and the protection of depositors. Therefore, we
recommend that enough space for self-regulation
be created by the formulation of skeleton laws, in
order to concentrate on the bottom line and thus to
aim at an optimum regulatory density in terms of
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Table 3: The Costs of Regulation in Wealth Management
Regulatory Burden
2002 [CHF per capita]
ASCB
BanksVlarge
ASCB
BanksVsmall
Private
Bankers
Securities
DealerVWealth
Management
Securities
DealerVSecurities
Trading
Regulatory burden 12’154 28’734 6’938 18’580 14’161
Compliance costs 10’935 24’270 6’412 15’255 11’568
Prevention of money
Laundering
5’059 8’374 2’746 4’936 145
Risk management 2’472 3’458 1’002 2’372 4’825
Equity/liquidity/accounting 1’561 5’400 829 2’107 4’508
Others 1’843 7’038 1’835 5’840 2’090
Incremental auditing costs 1’157 4’327 440 3’039 1’979
External auditing costs 357 1’600 145 2’174 1’057
Internal auditing costs 800 2’727 295 865 922
Direct costs 62 137 86 286 614
Sources: HUBLI (2004), MARTI (2004).
Perspectives
good practice^ rather than Bbest practice^ guide-
lines. The international Blevel playing field^,
implying compliance with certain common quality
standards, should also be adhered to. However, it
is important to ensure that Switzerland does not
suffer from competitive disadvantages caused by
overregulation compared to other countries. It must
not be overlooked that many financial centres
enjoy regulatory advantages which significantly
boost their attractiveness and competitiveness. A
Bzero tolerance^philosophy, as intended by present-
day Swiss regulation projects, will almost in-
evitably lead to high marginal costs which are not
justified by marginal benefits in every case.[21]
The various regulation projects should be better
coordinated in terms of content, time and system-
atics. Considering the differences between the
various wealth management suppliers with regard
to size and risk profiles, the regulatory design
should be modular. Industry concentration caused
by economies of scale in the area of auditing and
compliance costs should be avoided. However, it
is important to set limits to differentiation and to
avoid high complexity because of the need for
transparency.
On economic-political grounds, it seems desirable
that the four regulatory concepts should explicitly
differ in terms of costs and benefits, in order to
provide real alternatives for the market partic-
ipants. Analysis of the regulatory frameworks and
the corresponding costs, however, reveals concep-
tual deficiencies in the regulatory design.
Banks benefit most from their regulatory status,
which allows them to be active in all areas of the
banking business and to profit from the prestige of
their banking status. Small ASCB Banks bear the
highest regulatory burden, with CHF 28’700 per
capita. For large ASCB Banks however, the costs
are much lower (CHF 12’200), even less than for
SDs (CHF 14’200Y18’600). In this context, a sig-
nificant weakness of the Swiss regulatory regime
becomes apparent: economies of scale favour
large companies and discriminate against small
financial institutes to a great extent.
Private Bankers benefit from certain regulatory
privileges, and this is reflected in a significantly
lower regulatory burden compared to banks and
SDs. Additionally, Private Bankers profit from a
high level of prestige and a good reputation
among the public. As regards income tax and
pension payments, Private BankersVbeing part-
nership companiesVare treated differently from
corporations; it would be desirable for company
taxation to be more neutral with regard to the
different legal structures of companies. Overall,
Private Banker status seems to be an attractive
regulatory framework in the wealth management
business.
The examinations prove a bank-equivalent regu-
latory burden for SD which seems to be rather
high. However, a comparison between those SDs
which predominately operate in wealth manage-
ment and small ASCB Banks reveals substantially
lower costs for the SDs (CHF 18’600 per capita).
Nevertheless, it is recommended that regulation
for SDs should be eased, in order to create a real
alternative to the banking license, in particular for
small providers. Furthermore, a differentiated
treatment of the five existing SD categories would
seem appropriate. At least non-account-keeping
SDs should be relieved, especially with regard to
equity guidelines and similar directives. Finally,
the SDs should be exempted from a future Basel II
regime.
On the basis of the limited range of services
provided by IAMs, it is obvious that they incur the
lowest regulatory costs of all four concepts. In
their final report, the Zufferey group of experts
(2000) proposed that IAMs be supervised pruden-
tially. The Zimmerli group of experts analyzed the
advantages and disadvantages of prudential super-
vision of IAMs, but the commission did not make
any recommendations regarding their general
supervision. In the U.S. and in European Union
(EU) countries such as Germany and France,
IAMs are supervised prudentially. It will become
more and more difficult for Swiss IAMs to offer
their services to customers in the EU without a
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 1 105
Perspectives
license provided by a national regulator like the
SFBC, as Swiss IAMs will face growing limi-
tations on their cross-border business as a result of
the lack of prudential regulation. Under the
amended EU Directive on collective investments
(UCITS fund guideline)[22], only supervised
wealth managers are authorised to manage assets
of an EU-domiciled investment fund. For this
reason, there should at least be a possibility for
Swiss IAMs to be supervised on a voluntary basis;
otherwise, they will lose their share of the
business with EU-domiciled investment funds.[23]
Such voluntary supervision could be conducted on
the basis of a modified SESTA or a new law for
IAMs. For small IAMs who are not dependent on
cross-border business and who would not be
capable of bearing additional regulatory costs, a
mandatory regime of prudential supervision could
lead to extinction. In order to protect their custo-
mers against operational losses, these small IAMs
could take out liability insurance to cover poten-
tial claims.[24] Both measures would lead to a
better image for the IAM industry and strengthen
the reputation of the Swiss financial industry as a
whole.
In the future, regulationsVand therewith the
regulatory burdenVwill most likely increase fur-
ther. Accordingly, banks and wealth management
firms should examine whether their business
processes still meet the regulatory requirements.
Through innovative and joint solutions in areas
such as transaction processing, education and IT-
applications, the regulatory burden may be re-
duced, client relationship officers may be relieved,
and smaller financial institutes may remain com-
petitive.
ENDNOTES
[1] SANTOS (2000), pp. 5.
[2] ZUFFEREY (2000), pp. 35 and 79.
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[11] HUBLI (2004), pp. 43Y48 and MARTI (2004),
pp. 57Y58.
[12] SFBC (2004a).
[13] DE´ROBERT (2004), pp. 34.
[14] Prevention of money laundering; Risk manage-
ment; Equity/liquidity/accounting; Others (Inde-
pendence of financial analysis, Market behaviour,
Guidelines on portfolio management agree-
ments, Fund distribution).
[15] Prudential regulation in the sense of an institu-
tional rather than a functional or market regula-
tion. Prudential regulation is ideally designed to
prevent the insolvency of the supervised insti-
tutes through preemptive measures like capital
requirements.
[16] With the exception of the canton Tessin where
IAMS need to be licensed.
[17] HESS (1999), pp. 1431.
[18] About half of all IAMS in Switzerland are not as-
sociated to a professional association. VILLIGER
(2001), pp. 19.
[19] ZOBL (1988), pp. 332 and 336.
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